Europe’s role in Gulf maritime security

In February 2022, the Council of the European Union (E.U.) gathered in Brussels to debate the extension of the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) idea to the North-Western Indian Ocean. First piloted within the Gulf of Guinea firstly of 2021, the CMP is a versatile device to boost maritime safety engagements by selling shared consciousness, evaluation, and data within the maritime house amongst member states. The Council thus concluded that the E.U. ought to improve coordination and cooperation with the European Maritime Consciousness within the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) surveillance mission and deemed the North-Western Indian Ocean, a area stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Southern Tropic and from the north of the Crimson Sea towards the middle of the Indian Ocean, a “maritime space of curiosity” (MAI). These choices — and, particularly, the MAI designation — constituted a uncommon consensus amongst E.U. member states that Gulf maritime safety is a strategic curiosity for Europe as a complete.

EMASOH, a French initiative, was launched in January 2020 to advertise regional de-escalation within the Gulf and guarantee freedom of navigation within the seas across the Strait of Hormuz. Headquartered on the French naval base Camp de la Paix in Abu Dhabi, it was arrange in response to the Iranian assaults on tankers and industrial ships in UAE waters and the strikes on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil amenities in Saudi Arabia, each in 2019. Shortly after the assaults, in January 2020, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal launched EMASOH as a maritime surveillance mission, arguing that such incidents have been undermining freedom of navigation within the Gulf and the security of ships within the Strait of Hormuz. EMASOH’s navy element, Operation AGÉNOR, consists of the eight E.U. international locations plus Norway and patrols the waterway with seven vessels and one aerial surveillance unit. Since March 2022, the operation has been underneath Belgian command. Seven of the 9 collaborating international locations are at the moment current within the Abu Dhabi HQ, whereas Portugal and Germany help the mission’s diplomatic monitor.

The Council’s choice to formally embrace EMASOH, which operates in parallel to the U.S.-led Worldwide Maritime Safety Assemble (IMSC), is a small step within the route of Europeans acknowledging that they gained’t at all times be capable of depend on the USA to defend their pursuits, even within the Gulf, lengthy perceived in Europe as an “American lake.”

Whither a European safety position within the Gulf?

This isn’t to say that the U.S. is leaving the Gulf or the Center East extra broadly. Even amid some downsizing over the previous couple of years, the U.S. nonetheless has greater than 13,000 troops and enormous navy bases within the Gulf and it performs a central position in various multilateral safety missions, together with within the maritime house. Nevertheless, the U.S. is actually recalibrating its involvement, pushed by battle fatigue at dwelling and shifting pursuits overseas, together with a pivot to comprise China within the Asia-Pacific and to finish American dependence on Center Jap vitality provides, which has lengthy been the first purpose for its regional posture.

Conversely, in gentle of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe is looking for to strengthen its vitality ties with Center Jap suppliers to beat its dependence on Russian oil and fuel — an effort that’s solely more likely to ramp up if the E.U. strikes to ban Russian oil imports. This has pushed European outreach to Algeria and Morocco, in addition to a push to rethink new vitality infrastructure to facilitate imports from international locations within the jap Mediterranean. Some European capitals are additionally eyeing Iranian fuel with renewed curiosity and are thus doubling down on efforts to revive the Joint Complete Plan of Motion (JCPOA) as quickly as doable.

Whereas North Africa, Iran, and the jap Mediterranean are possible long-term choices, present vitality infrastructures in these locations is both derelict or non-existent, precluding a fast repair for Europe’s vitality disaster. The actual jackpot could be securing an vitality partnership with the Gulf monarchies, which may enhance provides to Europe way more rapidly and have the capability to stabilize the worldwide vitality market on the expense of Russia. Officers from Italy and Germany have already secured provide offers with Qatar, whereas France’s TotalEnergies will start transport Emirati oil to Europe this month. Additionally this month, the E.U. plans to launch a brand new vitality technique that may function a inexperienced vitality partnership with the Gulf monarchies, increasing on current hydrogen offers between E.U. member states, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. European policymakers perceive that if the seas across the Arabian Peninsula grow to be a conduit for a rising share of important vitality shipments to Europe, Gulf maritime safety will grow to be a strategic curiosity for the E.U.

This maritime house is already of strategic significance for Europe economically. Greater than 10% of world commerce passes by means of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, along with the Suez Canal. A big share of this commerce both comes from or goes to Europe. Not solely do European international locations have vital commerce relations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, however some GCC ports are additionally changing into key nodes of financial connectivity between Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Lastly, a stronger position for Europe as a safety supplier within the Gulf has a geopolitical rationale, too. In truth, it might change how the Gulf monarchies see European international locations within the area. Gulf capitals don’t regard European international locations as regional safety suppliers, with the partial exception of France and the U.Okay. As they aren’t safety or geopolitical actors, Europeans are additionally not seen as safety or geopolitical interlocutors. This has prevented them from influencing the insurance policies of the Gulf monarchies of their shared neighborhood — the Mediterranean — or from making vital contributions to de-escalation between the Gulf and Iran, one thing they strongly help. It has additionally prevented European leaders — even those that do have hyperlinks to Gulf monarchies, akin to France’s President Emmanuel Macron — from persuading Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to unequivocally facet with the U.S. and Europe towards Russia amid its invasion of Ukraine. A extra significant position for Europeans as safety suppliers within the maritime house additionally suits effectively with the upcoming complete E.U.-GCC coverage partnership doc, to be printed later this yr, which can encourage extra joint coaching and naval workouts.

Future prospects

The E.U.’s choice to grow to be strategically extra concerned within the maritime safety of the North-Western Indian Ocean may have a number of future implications.

The CMP will allow the E.U. to share intelligence and operationalize coordination within the North-Western Indian Ocean, successfully establishing hyperlinks between EMASOH and Operation Atalanta, an E.U. mission to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia. Turning the Strait of Hormuz and the Crimson Sea into one built-in space ought to improve the capability to safe each.

The E.U.’s embrace of EMASOH is the final word greenlight for a brand new era of advert hoc, versatile missions that may be deployed in delicate areas for E.U. pursuits, offsetting the prolonged decision-making technique of the E.U.’s Frequent Safety and Protection Coverage (CSDP). This class of core group missions, which incorporates Operation Takuba within the Sahel and the European Naval Engagement within the Indo-Pacific, will grow to be much more widespread and improve the European projection functionality. Moreover, since EMASOH now has a transparent mandate from the E.U., each current members, akin to Germany and Portugal, and different international locations that weren’t a part of the preliminary group is likely to be extra inclined to contribute militarily. EMASOH might want to beef up its naval deployments and improve its aerial surveillance capabilities whether it is to grow to be credible amid heightened multipolar competitors within the area.

For now, Gulf international locations are usually not able to offer maritime safety across the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea on their very own. They proceed to argue that the world is of world curiosity and subsequently they shouldn’t be the only actors answerable for maritime safety. Given this, the chance is that Gulf actors will invite increasingly more worldwide companions — together with rivals of the U.S. and Europe, akin to China and Russia — to patrol the waters. A extra vital European presence could deter regional actors from such strikes, whereas permitting the U.S. to relinquish among the safety burden that it needs to dump.

Lastly, the European reference the North-Western Indian Ocean signifies they could quickly transcend the present operational areas of Atalanta and EMASOH. Certainly, some E.U. international locations — particularly, France — have argued that the entire Crimson Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait are very important to European pursuits. By defending these waterways, E.U. international locations may reap three advantages within the brief, medium, and long run. First, they might consolidate a European presence within the Crimson Sea, the place Russia has been looking for to make inroads. Second, maintaining a tally of Bab el-Mandab and Yemen’s Crimson Coastline would possibly give Europeans extra of a voice within the context of the Yemen battle. Third and at last, it may additionally doubtlessly scale back the Houthis’ capability to make use of threats towards worldwide transport as leverage towards the diplomatic course of to finish the battle.

Dr. Cinzia Bianco is a analysis fellow on the European Council on International Relations, the place she works on political, safety, and financial developments within the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf area and relations with Europe. She can be a non-resident scholar with MEI’s Protection and Safety Program and a senior analyst at Gulf State Analytics. 

Matteo Moretti is a Junior Member on the Worldwide Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome. His analysis pursuits embrace the EU’s overseas relations, particularly with the Gulf. The views expressed on this piece are their very own.

Picture by EMASOH