Will Sistani be the Last Legend? The Challenge of Succession and the Future of the Marj’aiyyah

The Relationship between Najaf and Tehran

Through the Qajar (1789-1925) and Pahlavi (1925-79) eras, the Iranian shahs confirmed nice respect towards the spiritual authority of Najaf; a few of them even proclaimed the emulation of the grand marj’a of Najaf. Doing so was a approach for them to confront and push again towards the spiritual authority of the Qom Seminary. The marj’a has spiritual authority over his followers, who’re obligated to observe his fatwas. Those that imitate different marj’as, nevertheless, are free from this obligation. In contrast, the Najaf marj’a didn’t present legitimacy to Baghdad’s authorities, which on the time was managed by a Sunni elite. So, these Iraqi rulers had no motivation to court docket the normal Shi’a authority, who additionally had little interest in them, particularly given the monetary independence of the marj’aiyyah, which is ensured by the spiritual taxes paid immediately by worshipers.

The popularity of Najaf’s authority by the shahs of Tehran was some extent of assist within the favor of the Najaf Seminary. The top of state in Iran favored an outdoor marj’a over the native ones. Thus, the grand marj’a of Najaf elevated his probabilities of having fun with reputation in Iran and political assist worldwide. For non-Shi’a, they thought-about the grand marj’a of Najaf because the spiritual authority revered by the robust Iranian king.⁷

The Islamic Revolution in 1979 was not merely a change within the Iranian regime. Iranian international relations had been additionally considerably affected, particularly with the conflict with Iraq (1980-88). Through the Iran-Iraq Struggle, the grand marja’a in Najaf, al-Khoei, refused to problem a fatwa supporting the Baathist regime, whereas the Iranian military was blessed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was, because the supreme chief, the chief commander of the military. Al-Khoei’s passive stance was appreciated by neither Baghdad nor Tehran. Thus, the long-term alliance between Najaf and Tehran was terminated, and the Baathist regime began to harass the marj’as with out the danger of scary Tehran. The Islamic regime in Tehran adopted the theocratic precept of velayat-e faqih, beneath which the faqih (jurist) serves as the overall deputy of the Hidden Imam, who is allowed to behave on behalf of the prophet and the 12 imams, together with overseeing the governance of the nation because the wali al-amr (guardian) of the Muslims. Khomeini and later Ali Khamenei imposed their will upon the Iranian public sphere as a supply of legitimacy aside from Qom and Najaf. The marj’aiyyah of Najaf maintained this passive political standing from the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 till the collapse of the Baathist regime in 2003.

The Rise of Sayyid Ali al-Sistani

Sayyid Ali al-Sistani was a pupil of three former marj’as: Borujerdi, al-Hakim, and al-Khoei. He was a really shut disciple of al-Khoei and one of many high mujtahids when his trainer handed away in 1992. Certainly, Sistani was the one who led the prayer on al-Khoei ‘s physique in a really personal funeral, which is, within the Shi’a practice, an indication of respect inside al-Khoei’s circle.⁸ His information and shut relationship with al-Khoei, nevertheless, weren’t the one the explanation why he was capable of acquire the present place and standing he holds right this moment.

Through the Eighties, quite a lot of distinguished students handed away. The Baathist regime executed Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in 1980. Al-Sadr was a younger artistic marj’a and influenced many clergy members who later turn out to be marj’as themselves, corresponding to Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935-2010). As well as, when the regime assassinated Sayyid Nasrallah al-Mustanbit in 1986, who was al-Khoei’s son-in-law and his substitute imam and prayer chief, Sistani changed him within the position. Al-Khoei additionally introduced distinctive members of the Najaf seminary to Qom both by alternative or to flee the merciless regime in Iraq. Students corresponding to Mohammad Hussaini Rouhani (d 1997), Jawad Tabrizi (d 2006), Wahid Khorasani, and Mohammad Sadeq Rouhani would have had a greater place if they’d stayed in Najaf, the key seminary of Shi’a theology.

When al-Khoei handed away on Aug. 8, 1992, Sistani was the grand marj’a’s closest disciple. The one main scholar alive in Najaf at the moment was Sayyid Abd al-A’la al-Sabziwari (1910-93), who handed away a 12 months after al-Khoei. From 1993, Sistani took on the position of grand marj’a of Najaf. Nearly all of al-Khoei’s wakils (representatives), together with al-Khoei’s sons who run his foundations, pledged allegiance to Sistani as their new marj’a — a robust supportive motion in Sistani’s favor.

Throughout the next years, the grand marj’as of Qom handed away in flip, an important of which had been Sayyid Mohammad Reza Golpaygani (d 1993) and Sheikh Mohammad Ali Araki (d 1994). Progressively, Sistani was acknowledged as al mojtahid-e aalam, which enhanced his authority to be the grand marj’a for Shi’a worldwide.

Sistani’s path to turning into the grand marj’a was very conventional, because the grand marj’a is mostly raised to the place both by being a robust competitor or an in depth disciple of the earlier one. When a scholar turns into the grand marj’a of Najaf, he’ll almost certainly additionally turn out to be the marj’a for Shi’a worldwide.

The Marj’aiyyah within the Publish-2003 Period

From the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the place of grand marj’a was targeted on spiritual affairs and had a really restricted position inside the political realm. Throughout that interval, the supreme chief in Tehran constructed a robust political, financial, and social community worldwide, serving the agenda of the Islamic Republic. The Imam Al-Khoei Benevolent Basis, which was established in 1989, was not a competitor with the Iranian community. Situated in London and with 15 branches in a few of the world’s most vital cities, this conventional group issues itself with charitable and missionary academic features traditionally related to the marj’aiyyah in Najaf; they at present observe Sistani as their marj’a.⁹

The collapse of the Baathist regime in Iraq was a turning level within the Center East that affected the area’s political, financial, and social affairs. The marj’aiyyah began to face new challenges with nice expectations from Iraqis who had simply been free of dictatorship and confronted international invasion. Because the grand marj‘a of Najaf, Sistani carries the hopes of Iraqis to take care of the issues ensuing from the 2003 invasion of Iraq, together with the American navy occupation itself, in addition to points like sectarian violence, political fragmentation, and corruption.

At this level, the marj’aiyyah shifted from a deal with surviving the harassment from the Baathist regime in Baghdad to observing the political panorama and interfering solely in essentially the most crucial circumstances.¹⁰ Sistani is turned to for steerage and his recommendation is sought by politicians in occasions of disaster, as they count on the Shi’a inhabitants to obey his pronouncements.¹¹ This can be a affordable assumption, for the reason that Iraqi prime minister “must take sufficient tangible steps on reform and combatting corruption to safe a gathering with the Grand Ayatollah.”¹² For the reason that invasion of Iraq, U.S. administrations have handled Sistani as “a serious energy dealer”¹³ who doesn’t train energy however holds nice affect upon the general public sphere and would become involved when it’s completely crucial. Sistani, nevertheless, approaches the political scene with the pragmatic and circumspect conduct of a civil state chief, somewhat than following the theocratic mannequin of Khomeini (i.e., velayat-e faqih). That’s to say, whatever the important energy that Sistani has, he’s not inquisitive about utilizing it to impose his will as a ruler or to become involved in governance. This perspective displays his view of the marj’aiyyah as a spiritual place, not a political one. The extra a marj’a will get concerned in state affairs, the extra potential errors he may make. As well as, turning into deeply concerned in Iraqi politics would solely put the grand marj’a of Najaf within the troublesome place of selecting between two undesirable choices:

• Turning into concerned within the political scene of different international locations with giant Shi’a populations, as a way to preserve his position because the transnational grand marj’a.
• Remaining in a passive political position, which might name into query his standing because the grand marj’a of Shi’a basically, and even solely amongst Iraqis.

It’s clear that neither place serves the marj’aiyyah as a transnational spiritual management. Thus, Sistani is establishing a brand new doctrine of the marj’aiyyah,¹⁴ which goals to steadiness his potential energy within the host-state of Iraq together with his broader religious management of the Shi’a inhabitants worldwide. Sistani has by no means taken any place or issued any fatwa concerning political upheaval in any nation apart from Iraq.¹⁵ This smart perspective ought to serve for example for the long run marj’as of Najaf; in any other case, Iraq and the Shi’a worldwide would face a tricky future with their Arab neighbors and different regional powers corresponding to Iran, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. Following what I name “Sistani Doctrine” ought to function the mannequin for future marj’as to keep away from potential political crises.

Sistani and the Concern of Succession

Primarily based on the historic background offered above, it isn’t a simple process to succeed the dominant transnational marj’a of Najaf. Succession entails many components past simply spiritual information. The robust community of scholars and clergy and the leaders of Shi’a communities are much more vital than being al mojtahid-e aalam (most educated scholar), which is often decided by the specialists who’re already or about to turn out to be mujtahids. These specialists typically assist their lecturers and the marj’as with whom they have already got a great connection and a wikalah (certificates of illustration).

One of the vital efficient steps for recognizing the brand new transnational grand marj’a is the pledge of allegiance from the transnational philanthropic foundations that function missionary charitable businesses related to the previous grand marj’as. The Imam al-Khoei Benevolent Basis has pledged allegiance to Sistani by itemizing him because the marj’a of the group.¹⁶ In line with the fifth article of the Khoei Basis’s structure, “The establishment is working beneath the supervision of the Grand Marj’a of the sect, His Eminence Grand Ayatollah Imam Abul-Qassim Al-Khoei so long as he’s alive. After him, the Grand marj’a of the sect who’s acknowledged by nearly all of the revered students, with the approval of a minimum of three-quarters of the members of the central committee of the establishment.”¹⁷ There’s one other narrative stating that the muse had pledged allegiance to Sayyid Mohammad Reza Golpaygani (d 1993), who refused to provide his blessing to the muse with out having precise authority over its administration and actions. Thus, the chairman of the muse, Sayyid Abd al-Majid al-Khoei,¹⁸ determined to declare that it could following Sistani because the grand marj’a.¹⁹

Sistani’s marj’aiyyah shouldn’t be restricted to the popularity of the Al-Khoei Basis, which provided the brand new marj’aiyyah a supervising position in an honorary place that allows the muse to gather spiritual taxes beneath Sistani’s auspices with out giving him precise authority concerning the administration. When he declared his marj’aiyyah in 1992, Sistani’s son-in-law, Sayyid Javad Shahrestani (b 1954), was already a well-established determine in Qom. Shahrestani, who moved to Qom in 1977, based the Ahl Al-Bayt Institute for the Revival of Shi’a Heritage in 1986. Through the 12 years he spent in Qom earlier than declaring his father-in-law as a marj’a, Shahrestani established a robust community that enabled him to advertise the brand new grand marj’a of Najaf in Iran. The Ahl Al-Bayt Institute was the arm of Sistani’s marj’aiyyah in Iran and the broader Center East. Shahrestani supervises the workplace of the marj’aiyyah, which is related to 25 Islamic facilities and institutes in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Germany.²⁰ Away from the Iraqi political scene, Sistani’s workplace in Qom and Shahrestani are the voice of the grand marj’a worldwide.²¹

Sistani’s employees launched new foundations such because the Imam Ali Basis in London, which identifies itself because the liaison workplace of Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani headed by the consultant of the marj’a, Sayyid Murtadha al-Kashmiri, Sistani’s son-in-law.²² Al-Kashmiri’s younger brother, Sayyid Mohammad Baqir Kashmiri, is operating the Imam Mahdi Affiliation of Marjaeya (I.M.A.M.), Inc. situated in Dearborn, Michigan and Fairfax, Virginia. Whereas Murtadha al-Kashmiri has the title of chairman of each foundations, Mohammad Baqir, the vice chairman, is the de facto chief of I.M.A.M.²³ At the moment, these foundations are stronger than the Al-Khoei Basis. So, any future candidate for the place of grand marj’a should acquire a pledge of allegiance from these foundations. At this level although, Kadhim and Slavin argue that the vast community of loyalties to Sistani is not going to simply switch to a successor.²⁴

Furthermore, the opposite kinds of networks wouldn’t play as efficient a job as these establishments do. Group leaders who assist different marj’as can’t keep away from selling the successor supported by these rich transnational establishments. For instance, many Iraqis adopted Sayyid Muhammad Muhammad-Sadiq al-Sadr (1953-99)²⁵ proper after al-Khoei, however this didn’t have an effect on Sistani’s marj’aiyyah worldwide. In Saudi Arabia, essentially the most senior Shi’a students didn’t declare the marj’aiyyah of Sistani till 2006. As a substitute, they supported Mohammad Hussaini Rouhani (1917-97), then Sheikh Mirza Ali Gharavi (1931-98), then Sheikh Jawad Tabrizi (1926-2006), and at last beneficial Sistani alongside Sheikh Wahid Khorasani (b 1921) and Sayyid Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim (b 1934-2021). This perspective, held by quite a lot of essentially the most influential students within the Saudi Shi’a group, didn’t put any marj’as as a critical competitor to Sistani, even within the Saudi Shi’a group. Because of this, the junior students who determined to ally with the transnational foundations of the marj’aiyyah gained extra standing of their communities by supporting the grand marj’a.

Iraq’s political fragmentation might also have an effect on the brand new marj’as, who will inherit Sistani’s neutrality and lack of assist for any explicit political celebration. Such an perspective requires a excessive degree of independence and recognition. The brand new grand marj’a must be fashionable, so politicians will contemplate his attitudes towards political points, and he additionally must be impartial, in order that he is not going to want their assist or fear about their anger. This consists of the Standard Mobilization Committees (PMCs), which want the blessing of the marj’aiyyah as a type of social/spiritual legitimacy.

Nations with sizeable Shi’a minorities is likely to be inquisitive about having a neighborhood marj’a or a minimum of having their Shi’a inhabitants observe a clergy who doesn’t have important political energy, even when it’s a latent energy. The centrality of the marj’aiyyah causes nice anxiousness concerning the connection between Shi’a residents and their spiritual transnational leaders, particularly within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states.²⁶