Iran and the Taliban after the US fiasco in Afghanistan

The return of Taliban rule over Afghanistan can have vital penalties for the area and worldwide politics extra broadly. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, Washington’s Afghanistan fiasco is about extra than simply the victory of the Taliban; it has been touted as affirmation that U.S. coverage within the Islamic world is doomed to fail. In its messaging, Tehran has tried to strengthen the thought for its companions and allies that it’s the solely dependable actor within the Center East, in opposition to a supposedly unreliable Washington that lacks strategic resolve. These quick geopolitical and ideological features, nonetheless, could possibly be overshadowed by the potential challenges {that a} Taliban-ruled Afghanistan might pose for Iran’s safety and regional pursuits in the long term.

Context

The Iranian authorities have cautiously welcomed Afghanistan’s new rulers, stressing that Tehran will base its coverage on the Taliban’s conduct. During a speech on Aug. 28, Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei mentioned, “The character of our relationships with governments relies on the character of their relations with us.” He additionally didn’t waste the chance to lambast the U.S. for having “acted extraordinarily shamelessly” in Afghanistan.

Iranian officers see the U.S. withdrawal as, in impact, a give up to the Taliban, a comparatively small, ideologically-driven militia group — a victory that they really feel vindicates their funding within the “Axis of Resistance” and its regional community of militia teams. It’s more likely to embolden Iran’s “offensive realist” regional technique, probably exacerbating tensions due to the latter’s zero-sum rationale.

Tehran has just lately been publicly redefining its relations with the Taliban, an erstwhile arch-enemy. In 1998, Iran and Afghanistan virtually went to conflict after the Taliban murdered various Iranian diplomats. However after 9/11 and the Taliban insurgency in opposition to the NATO/U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, Iranian-Afghan tensions took a again seat, as Tehran welcomed the complications the Taliban created for the U.S. navy presence there. Nonetheless, it was solely in 2015 that relations between Tehran and the Taliban began to draw worldwide consideration. From that time on, Iran steadily made its contacts with the Taliban public, justifying it as an effort to reconcile rival pursuits in a neighboring nation.

Iran’s ideological and materials features

The U.S. Afghanistan debacle has offered two varieties of advantages for Tehran: one definitive, the opposite possible.

Definitive features

In response to the Islamic Republic’s narrative, what occurred in Afghanistan will result in additional setbacks for the U.S. throughout the Center East. President Ebrahim Raisi mentioned the U.S. presence within the area causes insecurity and Washington’s withdrawal from Afghanistan could be a possibility for “peace and safety.” Gen. Mohammad-Reza Naqdi, deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for coordination affairs, has warned that, “American bases within the Center East will quickly meet the identical destiny” and has known as upon all regional nations and teams to “separate their path from America.”

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) claimed from its workplaces in Lebanon and Syria — two nations that Tehran counts amongst its regional “Axis of Resistance” — that the folks, pundits, and politicians there uniformly consider the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has proven that Washington brings insecurity to the area and that resistance is the one efficient response. The IRIB report featured the leaders of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi motion repeating the official Iranian line by stressing that these home forces of their respective nations whose hopes have been pinned on Washington will find yourself going through the identical destiny as their Afghan counterparts. Additionally, the report emphasised that the “historic defeat” of the U.S. is an harbinger of the top of U.S. presence and affect in West Asia. Equally, the IRGC-affiliated Fars Information Company has used the state of affairs to assault home political rivals, i.e. the reformists, which it refers to as “pro-Western teams,” stating they need to concede that the U.S. shouldn’t be “invincible” given its “humiliating escape” from Afghanistan.

The truth that the U.S. was in the end unsuccessful in opposition to the Taliban has prompted Iranian officers to assume that they’ll defeat the U.S. elsewhere within the area utilizing sponsored militias. In different phrases, whereas the Biden administration had introduced that they wish to impose restrictions on Iran’s regional insurance policies amid ongoing nuclear talks, the White Home’s determination on Afghanistan satisfied the Islamic Republic that its proxies are a very powerful type of leverage it has — one it can’t afford to lose.

Possible features

The victory of the Taliban in opposition to the U.S. may additionally function an asset in Tehran’s fingers to undermine Washington’s strain. Iran has been one of many few nations whose embassy nonetheless stays open in Kabul. Shargh, a reformist every day, revealed an interview that emphasizes the alternatives for China, Russia, and Iran in a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. China has welcomed the re-emergence of the Taliban, and Iran sees this as an sudden alternative to spice up its relationship with Beijing, respiratory life into the 25-year “strategic accord” the 2 sides just lately signed. In Raisi’s first name since taking workplace with Chinese language President Xi Jinping, he acknowledged that, “Iran is able to cooperate with China in establishing safety, stability, and peace in Afghanistan.” Javan, a every day near the IRGC, has burdened that “at present [for Iran] the connection with China and Russia could be extra necessary than nuclear negotiations […]. The West and significantly the U.S. are shocked by the failure in Afghanistan and it’s the finest alternative for all three sides [Iran, Russia, and China] to benefit from it.”

Past potential geopolitics features, the Taliban takeover might also create financial alternatives for Iran. Kayhan, an ultraconservative every day, has already began referring to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as a member of the “Axis of Resistance,” whereas emphasizing the significance of Iranian gas exports to the nation, which have continued because the Taliban takeover, and famous that they’ll bolster Tehran’s “resistance financial system.” Mohammad-Mehdi Javanmard-Qassab, Iran’s commerce adviser in Afghanistan, added, “The Taliban have lowered import tariffs by one-eighth, making it a lot simpler and sooner for merchants to clear their items.”

The Islamic Republic has suffered tremendously from unilateral U.S. sanctions during the last three years, and Tehran appears to be like for any alternative to avoid U.S. strain. Afghanistan might harbor potential for Iran to export its items. Aladdin Mir-Mohammad-Sadeghi, vice chairman of the Iran-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce, expressed hope that if “the guarantees made by Taliban officers” are saved, bilateral commerce may probably attain $3 billion.

Key elements of Iranian technique

Beneath these circumstances, the Islamic Republic has begun to rebrand the Taliban as a reformed entity whose rule will likely be completely different from what the world witnessed within the Nineties. This rebranding marketing campaign is primarily being pursued by IRGC-affiliated shops. The purpose appears to be to justify and legitimize cooperation with an entity deemed hostile to Iran for nearly twenty years, particularly among the many Iranian public. The identical shops — together with senior Iranian officers — are additionally exploiting the Afghanistan debacle for propaganda functions, as an indication of U.S. decline and Washington’s unreliability, whereas concomitantly emphasizing Tehran’s standing as a dependable energy within the Center East to its state and non-state allies.

On the similar time, Iran, which is already residence to some 2.5 million Afghans, and whose dire home financial state of affairs means it can’t afford a brand new wave of Afghan refugees, might use the Afghan exodus to blackmail Europe, the place most of these refugees would wish to find yourself. This comes amid discussions that coordination and cooperation with Tehran could be indispensable to avoiding a brand new main refugee wave into Europe. Tehran might use this as a possibility to attempt softening Europe’s stance in areas just like the nuclear talks.

Vindicated by the U.S. defeat by the hands of the “Islamic resistance,” Iran will even extra confidently pursue its offensive “Axis of Resistance” insurance policies. Ali-Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to the supreme chief in worldwide affairs, has mentioned that the Iran-led and -centered “Axis of Resistance” consists of “Yemen, Tehran, Baghdad, Al-Bukamal, Damascus, Beirut, Gaza,” including that “Afghanistan can be a part of this axis.” Actually, Iranian authorities see the “Axis of Resistance” as their most necessary asset in opposition to the U.S. and hope that Afghanistan will develop their sphere of energy projection.

Doable dangers

The true and potential alternatives Iran sees in Afghanistan however, the consolidation of Taliban rule may additionally contain severe challenges for Iran. Initially, the Taliban’s method to native Shiites can have a major influence on Tehran-Kabul relations. Throughout their reign within the Nineties, Taliban had been identified for, amongst different issues, their robust anti-Shi’a ideology, mirrored in systematic harassment, torture, and killing of the Shi’a Hazara minority. For now, publicly Iran nonetheless largely maintains the parable of a reformed Taliban that may respect the rights of ethnic and spiritual minorities. Actually, in latest weeks the Taliban have tried to reassure Tehran about this challenge, together with by permitting the Shi’a to carry Ashura mourning rituals in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, it’s unclear whether or not the Taliban will proceed to take action after consolidating their rule. Crucially, even when Taliban leaders are prepared to pursue a extra pragmatic coverage on this regard, there isn’t a assure that the group’s extra radical components, and even peculiar rank and file, will obey. This will result in bilateral tensions and even battle ought to Afghan Shi’as be killed. Such a state of affairs would put Iran between a rock and a tough place: If it decides to intervene militarily in Afghanistan, it could be caught in the identical quagmire that engulfed america and the Soviet Union earlier than it. Nonetheless, sitting idly by whereas the Taliban suppress Afghan Shi’as would undermine Iran’s credibility as a protector of the Shi’a sect.

Aside from the confessional issue, the Taliban’s extremely ethnocentric and monopolistic method to energy is one other problem for Iran. This was mirrored within the checklist of Taliban cupboard ministers introduced on Sept. 7. In response to the checklist, the subsequent authorities of Afghanistan will likely be fully dominated by ethnic Pashtuns. As well as, even among the many Taliban leaders, figures near Pakistan have a majority within the cupboard. That is in stark distinction to Iran’s want for a extra inclusive authorities, through which at the least these Taliban factions nearer to Tehran – if not different ethnic or confessional factions – could be represented. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme Nationwide Safety Council (SNSC), took to Twitter to precise Tehran’s dissatisfaction with the composition of the Taliban authorities. Iran might really feel it has already misplaced the battle for affect in Afghanistan to Pakistan. Extreme Pakistani affect may threaten Iran’s pursuits in some necessary areas, together with on the port of Chabahar, which was supposed to attach India to Central Asia by way of Afghanistan and was seen as a rival to the Pakistani port of Gwadar.

Furthermore, Pakistan shouldn’t be the one state redefining its function in Afghanistan’s geopolitical theater. Having hosted the Taliban’s political bureau for years whereas taking part in the important thing function in facilitating U.S.-Taliban diplomacy, Qatar is one other actor whose function has already change into indispensable. Though, in contrast to a lot of the different Persian Gulf monarchies, Doha has usually had favorable relations with Tehran in recent times, the 2 nations don’t see eye-to-eye on a variety of necessary regional points, together with the Syrian disaster. As such, Qatar’s rising affect in Afghanistan may present it with leverage to achieve concessions from Iran in Arab world affairs. Qatar’s shut ally Turkey may additionally use the state of affairs to its benefit. Turkey’s willingness to play a extra energetic function in Afghanistan, together with in securing the Kabul Worldwide Airport, in addition to financial cooperation with the brand new regime, may put Iran in a tough place. An elevated Turkish presence in Afghanistan, together with Ankara’s just lately solidified foothold within the South Caucasus, may create a state of affairs through which Iran finds itself just about strategically encircled by its regional rival.

Lastly, Iran will as soon as once more face a severe menace on its jap frontier if the Taliban fail to determine stability and safety in Afghanistan and deter extremist and terrorist teams corresponding to ISIS and al-Qaeda. Actually, it isn’t but clear whether or not the Taliban have really severed ties with al-Qaeda’s international terror community. In addition to, the Afghan offshoot of ISIS, generally known as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), may benefit from ongoing instability and probably change into a severe menace to the area. As Afghanistan’s quick neighbor, Iran stands to face essentially the most urgent safety challenges from a possible new wave of terrorism emanating from the nation.

Advantages and challenges

The Biden administration’s sudden determination to hurry up the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan has offered a combined bag of possible and unsure advantages for the Islamic Republic, in addition to various potential challenges. Firstly, Tehran’s studying that the U.S. was bested by a militia group has satisfied it that its coverage of supporting Islamist militias and actions is one of the simplest ways to restrain and defeat Washington within the Center East. It’s as but unclear how far Iran’s efforts to rebrand the Taliban domestically as a reformed group will flip from a story right into a actuality, simply as it’s too early to foretell how Taliban-ruled Afghanistan will act.

In sum, Tehran hopes to learn from the Taliban takeover in geopolitical and financial phrases. The brand new geopolitical panorama, Iran hopes, will present it with an opportunity to boost its relations with China and Russia by presenting itself because the Center East’s indispensable energy. Iranian officers have emphasised their “Look East” foreign-policy orientation, and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could possibly be an sudden present on this regard, offering a extra profitable “Japanese” anchoring, supported by Iran’s full membership within the Shanghai Cooperation Group (SCO). That mentioned, there are quite a few uncertainties relating to how the Taliban will really govern and these will forestall Iranian officers from absolutely counting on the ideological and geopolitical features they appear to have achieved in Afghanistan, at the least for now.

Ali Fathollah-Nejad is the writer of the much-acclaimed Iran in an Rising New World Order: From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani. He’s an affiliated scholar with the Afro–Center East Centre (AMEC, Johannesburg); Freie Universität (FU) Berlin’s Heart for Center Japanese and North African Politics; and the Centre d’Etudes de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CECID) at Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). You’ll be able to observe him on Twitter.

Hamidreza Azizi is an Alexander von Humboldt Fellow with the Center East and Africa Analysis Division of the German Institute for Worldwide and Safety Affairs (SWP), Berlin; a Ph.D. in Regional Research from the College of Tehran; and a former Assistant Professor of Regional Research at Shahid Beheshti College, Tehran (2016-20). You’ll be able to observe him on Twitter. The views expressed on this piece are their very own.

Photograph by MARCUS YAM/LOS ANGELES TIMES/Getty Pictures